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TIME VALUE OF MONEY AND INCOME TAX EVASION
UNDER RISK-AVERSE BEHAVIOR:
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE·
by
STEVEN E. CRANE AND FARROKH NOURZAD**

I. INTRODUCTION
In the years since the 'Original work by Allingham and Sandmo [1972], income tax
evasi'On has been analyzed extensively. Most of the w'Ork has been theoretical in
nature. H'Owever, a number 'Of empirical studies have also appeared in the
professional literature. This paper contains both types of analysis. From a
theoretical perspective, we are interested in extending the traditi'Onal evasion
framework so as to incorporate the possible effect of interest rates 'On a risk-averse
individual's decisi'On t'O evade. Empirically, we attempt t'O provide, at an aggregate
level, s'Ome evidence regarding the nature 'Of this relati'Onship, as well as the
relati'Onship between evasi'On and its 'Other maj'Or determinants.
Despite the extensive literature 'On tax evasi'On, little attenti'On has been given t'O
the p'Ossible r'Ole 'Of interest rates. It is s'Omewhat surprising that this issue has n'Ot
been pursued. It represents a natural extensi'On 'Of the simple dynamic m'Odel
considered briefly by Allingham and Sandm'O [1972] in the final secti'On 'Of their
seminal article. That m'Odel permitted them t'O establish that m'Ost 'Of the
implicati'Ons 'Of their static m'Odel held in the dynamic case. But because 'Of its
si mplicity (e.g., the individual was assumed t'O have n'O time preference), they
cauti'Oned that their dynamic results sh'Ould be c'Onsidered as tentative, and
enc'Ouraged additi'Onal research in this area.
As far as we kn'Ow, 'Only Spr'Oule, K'Omus, and Tsang [1980] and Rickard, Russell,
and H'Owroyd [1982], have included interest rates in their m'Odels. While b'Oth 'Of
these m'Odels provide valuable insights int'O the evasi'On problem, they are n'Ot
primarily c'Oncerned with the role 'Of interest rates. The f'Ormer analyzes evasi'On
under a negative inc'Ome tax system, while the latter f'Ocuses 'On the role 'Of
retroactive penalties. Further, b'Oth c'Onsider the special case 'Of a risk-neutral
individual. Thus, neither treatment of the role 'Of interest rates is c'Ompletely
satisfact'Ory, and additi'Onal analysis is warranted.
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On an intuitive level, it is easy to see how interest rates might affect the
individual's assessment of the expected costs and benefits of evasion. Income that is
successfu~y unreported can be invested in order to generate additional future
income. Other things equal, this increases the return to successful underreporting,
which, ignoring risk attitudes, should cause evasion to increase. On the other hand.
the cost of unsuccessful evasion includes not only additional taxes and penalties,
but also interest charges. Other things equal, higher interest rates increase the cost
of unsuccessful evasion, and, ignoring risk considerations, should cause evasion to
decrease. The individual's actual response depends on which of these two effects
dominates,as well as on his/her attitude towards risk.
Although the direction in which interest rates may affect tax evasion cannot be
determined intuitively, certain insights may be gained from recognizing the
possibility of tax avoidance and its probable interaction with tax evasion. Ceteris
paribus, an increase in the interest rate may be expected to increase tax avoidance.
This is because higher interest rates increase the return to avoidance without
increasing the associated costs, since avoidance, a legal activity, is not subject to
penalties. To the extent that avoidance and evasion are complementary, increased
avoidance should be accompanied by increased evasion. However, if the two
activities are substitutes, then no inference can be drawn regarding the effect of
interest rates on tax evasion. 1 This underscores the need for a formal analysis of the
effect of interest rates on income tax evasion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
develop a simple theoretical model of income tax evasion that explicitly considers
the role of interest rates under risk-averse behavior. This is followed by Section III,
where we specify and estimate an empirical evasion equation based on this
theoretical model using time-series data for the U.S. In the final section, we
summarize our findings.
II. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
In developing our model of tax evasion, we follow the general framework
suggested by Yitzhaki [1974]. This choice was influenced by the fact that in
Yitzhaki's model penalties are based on evaded taxes, as is the current practice in
the U.S. 2 However, we modify Yitzhaki's model in three ways. First, in order to
explicitly incorporate interest rates, we replace current income with permanent
income, which we define as the present value of the lifetime stream of income.
Second, we allow for the effect of inflation by including prices in the model. 3 To
date, only Fishburn [1981] has considered this issue. Third, we specify the
individual's decision variable in terms of the proportion oftrue income that is to be
underreported, rather than the level of reported income as in Yitzhaki [1974]. This
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allows us to compare our results with respect to the effect of interest rates and prices
with those reported by Sproule, Komus, and Tsang [1980], and Fishburn [1981],
respectively.
Consider a risk-averse individual with a cardinal utility function, U. defined over
the present value of real lifetime income, Q = !.(y,lp)(l+r)"', where y, is income in
period t = O. 1• .... n. p is the price deflator, and r is the individual's rate of time
preference. Make the standard assumptions that U(Q) > o. U'(Q) > O. and U"(Q) <
O. for all Q > O. The taxpayer faces an income tax rate, 0 < 8 < 1, and has to decide
whether, and to what extent to evade taxes. If the taxpayer chooses to evade, he/she
is assumed to underreport his/her true income by a constant fraction, A. The
taxpayer's subjective assessment of the probability of getting caught is 0 < II < 1.
Detected evaders are subjected to a penalty rate, 6> 1. which is imposed on evaded
taxes.
With probability II the evader will be detected, in which case hislher real income
after taxes and penalties will be
(I)

ZI = !.(llp)[y , - 8(l-A)yJ(l+r)"' - 6!.(lIp)8Ay ,(l+r)",

On the other hand, with probability (1 - II) the evader will go undetected and will
enjoy real disposable income of
(2)

Z z = !.(llp)[y, - 8(1 - A)yJ(l

+ rT'

The taxpayer chooses the proportion of income that is to be underreported, A, so
as to maximize expected utility
(3)

E{U(Q)] = IIU(ZI)

+ (1

- II)U(Zl)

Differentiating (3) with respect to A. and using (I) and (2), we get the necessary
condition for an extremum
(4)

Off)

=

8I( ~y'(l+r)"'[II(l-6)U'(ZI)+(l-II)U'(Zl)]

= 0

which can be written in an implicit form as
(5)

<l>(A, II, 6, 8, y. p. r)

Differentiating (4) with respect to A, we obtain the sufficient condition for a
maximum,
(6)

which is strictly negative under the previously stated assumptions. We have thus
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established the existence of a unique solution to the taxpayer's optimization
problem.
Because we are interested in the comparative static implications of the model, it is
essential to examine the restrictions that must be placed on its parameters in order
to obtain an interior solution. Since expected marginal utility is decreasing, we must
have that
(7)

which requires
(8)

6II

<1

Moreover, we must have that
(9)

cJl(I. II,6,8,yr.p.r) = 8I(.1.)y,(l+rT'(II(1-6)U'{I(.1.)(y,86Yr)(l+rT'l

P

P

+ (l-II)U'{I(.1.)Yr(l+rT'J) < 0
P

which is satisfied as long as
(10)

Note that the left-hand side of (10) is a (positive) fraction so that there is no
contradiction with (8). Thus, (8) and (10) provide a set of conditions for the
existence of a unique interior solution, AD, to the taxpayer's evasion problem.
We are now in a position to conduct comparative static analysis of the effect of
variations in the parameters of the model. Let us begin with the effect of the
probability of detection, II. Differentiating (5) with respect to II using (4), and
applying the Implicit Function Theorem (1FT) using (6), we have

which is strictly negative, given (6) and the assumptions of the model. Thus, higher
probabilities of detection result in a lower proportion of income underreported
Let us next consider the effect of the other compliance policy tool, the penalty
rate, 6. This requires differentiating (5) with respect to 6 using (4), and applying the
1FT using (6) to get
(12)

~~o = -

(jy8III( ~)Yr(l+rTr{8A(6-I)I(-~)Yr(l+rT'ulI(ZI)-U'(Zl)]
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which is strictly negative in view of (6) and the assumptions of the model. Thus,
other things equal, higher penalty rates result in a lower proportion of income
underreported. This result, along with that pertaining to the detection probability,
is consistent with most models in the literature (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo
[1972], Fishburn [1981], Srinivasan [1973]).
Let us now examine the effect of the tax rate, 8, on >0. 0• Differentiating (5) with
respect to 8 using (4), and applying the 1FT using (6), we obtain

where R.(Z) = - U"(Z) I U'(Z) is Arrow's [1971] measure of absolute risk aversion.
Clearly, the sign of (13) depends on the sign of the second bracket. This is in line
with Yitzhaki's [1974] finding that, when taxes are proportional and penalties are
imposed on evaded taxes, changes in the tax rate generate only an income effect
whose sign depends on the properties of the absolute risk aversion function. Since
6>0. > O. under Arrow's Hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion, (13) is
negative, implying that higher taxes lead to lower proportional underreporting.
This, too, is consistent with Yitzhaki's finding that, ignoring the time value of
money, higher tax rates result in higher levels of reported income. Note that
Arrow's Hypothesis is only a sufficient condition for a negative relationship
between the tax rate and the optimal proportion of income underreported.
Turning to the effect of true income, y" we have that

whereR,(Z) = - (U"(Z) I U'(Z)]Z is Arrow's [1971] measure of relative risk
aversion. Under Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion, (14) is
negative, implying that higher levels of true income lead to reduced proportional
underreporting, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with the finding of
Allingham and Sandmo [1972] and Fishburn [1981], among others. Note that in
this case Arrow's Hypothesis is both necessary and sufficient for the negative
relationship between income and >0. 0•
Let us next consider the effect of inflation on >0.0. Differentiating (5) with respect
to p using (4), and applying the 1FT using (6), we obtain

Clearly, under Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion, (15) is
unambiguously positive, indicating that higher prices lead to higher proportional
underreporting. This is consistent with Fishburn's [1981] finding.
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Finally, let us examine the effect of the variable which is of particular interest to
us, the rate of interest, r. Differentiating (5) with respect to rusing (4), and applyin,
the 1FT using (6), we.get

Under Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion, (16) is positive,
implying that higher interest rates lead to increased proportional underreportina.
ceteris paribus. It is interesting to note that under the assumption of risk aversion
we are able to obtain this conditional result. However, if risk neutrality is assumed,
the partial derivative of AD with respect to r is sign ambiguous, as in Sproule,
Komus, and Tsang [1980, p. 313].
To summarize, our simple model indicates the following. First, regardless ofthe
properties of the risk aversion functions, there is an unambiguously negative
relationship between optimal proportional underreporting, AD, and both the
detection probability and the penalty rate. Second, if one is willing to subscribe to
Arrow's Hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion, one would expect a
negative relationship between AD and the tax rate. However, this hypothesis is only a
sufficient condition for such a relationship. Third, under Arrow's Hypothesis of
increasing relative risk aversion one would expect (i) a negative relationship
between true income and AD, (ii) a positive relationship between inflation and AD,
and (iii) a positive relationship between interest rates and AD. Note that here
Arrow's Hypothesis is both a necessary and a sufficient condition.
We are now in a position to conduct our empirical analysis. Where the theoretical
results are unconditionally determinant, this empirical analysis should provide
confirmation or refutation. Where the theoretical findings are conditional, we hope
our empirical analysis will offer some insight into the nature of the relationships in
question.
III. AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Several problems are encountered when conducting aggregate empirical analysis
of the effect of interest rates on evasion. First, it is difficult to obtain accurate
measures of evasion since it is an unobserved phenomenon. Second, our focus on
the effect of interest rates requires us to use time-series data, thereby limiting our
choice of an evasion measure even further. Third, our interest in aggregate analysis
poses not only the usual aggregation problems, but also the additional difficulty of
aggregating risk aversion.
Fortunately, these problems are not insurmountable. Despite the measurement
problems, several attempts have been made to estimate the extent of tax evasion in
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the U.S. These are reviewed and critically evaluated by Frey and Pommerehne
[1982]. Of these measures some are time series spanning a period of sufficient
length, thereby making them suitable for our purposes. Moreover, both
aggregation problems can be overcome. First, aggregate counterparts of the
arguments in (5) can be developed, as discussed in Appendix A. Second, the recent
work by Szpiro [1983] provides a theoretical justification for the aggregation of risk
aversion.· Therefore, a link can be established between the microfoundations laid
out in the previous section and the aggregate analysis we wish to undertake.
Based on the theoretical framework formulated in Section II, we specify
the following aggregate empirical counterpart of the implicit evasion function given
in (5)
(17)

A, = 00 + o/TI, + 016,· + oJ8, + 041nyt
+ 06', + 07 w, + 08 1 + E,

+ oJp,

where w is the wage and salary share of total income, 1 is an annual time index, the
asterisk indicates that the corresponding variable has been instrumented as
discussed in Appendix A, the dot represents proportionate rate of change, and all
other notations are as defined in Section U.s
Note that (17) differs from (5) in several ways. First, it contains an additional
right-hand-side variable, w. This is included to allow for the fact that in the U.S.
wage-and-salary income is difficult to conceal, due to tax information reporting by
employers (see, for example, Clotfelter [1983] and Tanzi [1980]). Second, the
income variable in (17) is expressed in logarithmic form in order to allow for
nonlinearities that may arise from risk-averse behavior. Third, (17) is specified in
terms of the rate of inflation, rather than the price level. Perhaps, a more consistent
specification of the price variable would be to express it in logarithmic form. But
given the specification of the income variable, this would cause severe
multicollinearity problems. Although several econometric techniques for handling
this problem are available, we do not believe the results could be as meaningfully
interpreted. This means that no inference can be drawn from our theoretical model
regarding the expected sign of the coefficient of p.
Equation (17) was estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt second-order
autoregressive procedure. The results are presented below, where the numbers in
parentheses are 1- statistics.
(18)

>.., = 16.56 - 0.02 TI, - 0.076,· +0.07 8, - 0. 10 Iny,·
(6.00)

(-0.53)

(-4. 16)

( 3.81)

(-6.14)

+ 0.68 p, + 0.66" - 0.09 w, - 0.34 1
(9.79) (8.08) (-2.52) (-3.05)
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iP
in

= 0.92
= -0.45 .
(-3.91)

DW=

in = -0.75
(-6.51)

2.07

It is evident from equation (18) that our model successfully captures the postulated
aggregate evasion relationship. With one exception, all parameter estimates are
statistically significant, and the adjusted Rl indicates that ninety-two percent oftbe
overall variation in the proportion of income underreported has been explained by
the model.
Let us begin our discussion of the results with an examination of the interest rate
variable. From (18) we see that interest rates are positively related to the proportion
of income unreported, and that this relationship is statistically significant. Based on
the coefficient of the rate of interest, a one percentage point increase in r results in
more than 0.66 percentage point increase in proportional underreporting, A. This
suggests that, other things equal, U.S. taxpayers have found, on average, that the
expected gain from investing unreported income to be greater than the expected
interest cost associated with unsuccessful evasion. This may be explained, at least in
part, by the fact that in the U.S. penalties imposed on detected evaders are not fully
retroactive. 6
The positive relationship between interest rates and underreporting also has an
interesting implication for fiscal policy. It has long been argued that bond-financed
fiscal policy generates higher interest rates which crowd out private spending. This
makes fiscal policy less effective and adds to the deficit by increasing the interest
cost of servicing the national debt. Our finding indicates that the deficit-induced
higher interest rates lead, ceteris paribus, to more evasion, less tax revenue, and
therefore a further increase in the deficit. In other words, tax evasion represents
another channel through which the crowding-out effect adversely influences the
budget.
Next we consider our findings for the other variables in our empirical model. In
general, we find significant coefficient estimates whose signs are consistent with our
theoretical expectations or with previous empirical work. Both the penalty rate and
the wage share variables are negatively related to the measure of evasion used here.
However, the detection probability, while having the expected negative sign, is not
statistically significant. This may be due to the failure of our proxy measure to
adequately capture this inherently subjective variable.
Turning to the effect of the tax rate, we find a direct relationship. This contrasts
with our theoretical expectations, but it is consistent with the empirical finding
reported by Clotfelter [1983], among others. A possible explanation for this direct
relationship is as follows. While our simple theoretical model employs a
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proportional tax function, our empirical model pertains to an economy with
progressive taxes. With progressive taxes, changes in tax rates affect the laborleisure and saving-consumption decisions, producing both substitution and income
effects. To the extent that the substitution effect dominates the income effect,
higher taxes result in increased evasion.
In the case of the income variable, a negative and statistically significant
coefficient is obtained. This has an interesting implication. Recall from (14) that
Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion is both necessary and
sufficient for a negative relationship between income and underreporting. Further
recall from (16) that this hypothesis is also necessary and sufficient for a positive
relationship between interest rates and underreporting. Coupled with the above
finding that interest rates and underreporting are positively related, our results with
respect to income provide some support for the hypothesis of increasing relative
risk aversion.
As for the effect of changes in the inflation rate, our results indicate a positive
link. This, too, has an interesting implication. It is often argued that because of the
bracket-creep effect, inflation enhances tax revenue. However, in view of the
positive relationship found here, the net effect of inflation on tax revenues may not
be as significant as is generally believed.
Finally, according to equation (18), proportional underreporting in the U.S. has
had a negative trend over the period of study. Coupled with the fact that the level of
aggregate unreported income has been rising over the same period, this finding
means that in absolute terms, tax evasion has grown less rapidly than income. This
is consistent with the above result that proportional underreporting falls as income
rises.
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper we examined the effect of interest rates on tax evasion in the U.S. We
began by developing a simple theoretical model which explicitly incorporated the
role of interest rates under risk-averse behavior. In addition to interest rates, this
model considered the effect on evasion of the probability of detection, the penalty
rate, the tax rate, the level of true income, and the price level.
Our comparative static analysis led to the conclusion that the direction of the
relationship between interest rates and evasion depended upon attitude towards
risk. Under the hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion advanced by Arrow,
we found that a direct relation can be expected from interest rates to the proportion
of income underreported. Results consistent with those reported in previous
theoretical literature were obtained for the other variables.
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To provide additional insight, we conducted an aggregate empirical analysis for
the U.S. over the period 1947-81. The results indicated that evasion and interest
rates were indeed directly related. The~ also supported previous empirical findinp
regarding the relationship between evasion and its other major determinants.
NOTES
• This research was partially funded by a grant from Marquette University College of Businea
Administration. We thank Professor Masatoshi A. Abe, whose comments in a Marquette Economics
Department Seminar Works bop led to this research .
•• The autbors are Assistant Professors of Economics at Marquette University, Milwaukee, USA.
1 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the effect of interest rates on tax avoidance,
and its possible implication for tax evasion. For a tbeoretical analysis oftbe interaction between income
tax evasion and tax avoidance, see Cross and Shaw [1982].
2 Except for tbe penalty base, Yitzbaki's model is similar to tbat of Allingham and Sandmo [1972].
Like many evasion models, Yitzbaki's employs a number of simplifying assumptions. For example, il
assumes a detection probability independent of income, as well as proportional tax and penalty
functions. While these and other complexities could be incorporated into the model, (as in, for example,
Fisbburn [1981], Koskela [1983], and Srinivasan [1973]), we have cbosen not to do so in order 10 keep
tbe exposition simple.
3 The rationale for inclUding the price level in a model of tax evasion is as follows. Price changes erode
the real value of a given level of nominal disposable income, tbereby providing an incentive for the
taxpayer to preserve his/her purchasing power through evasion. For more on this, see Fishburn [1981].
4 Although Szpiro's analysis is in terms of absolute risk aversion, it seems plausible that the same
general conclusion holds for the case of relative risk aversion. This is a topic of current interest to the
authors.
S Note that (17) is a reduced-form equation. We chose that approach because our primary interest is in
testing the interest rate-evasion hypothesis. Clearly, if one wished to trace the effect of tax evasion
through the macro economy, one would have to employ an appropriat~ structural model. For a
theoretical analysis of the general equilibrium effects of tax evasion, see Peacock and Shaw [19821, and
Ricketts [1984].
6 In this case, the U.S . Tax Code provides for a statute of limitations of three to six years.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
In this appendix we develop the aggregate empirical counterparts of the arguments in (5) which are
used in (17), provide the rationale for their selection, and indicate how we handle several potential
econometric problems.
PROPORTIONAL UNDERREPORTINO, A. Our analysis requircs aggregate time-serics data for the
U.S. spanning a period of sufficient length. As far as we know, only two data serics meet tbis
requiremeht: Tanzi's [1980] cstimates of evaded taxes and Park's cstimates of unreported income.
Unfortunately, because the former estimatcs were obtained from an econometric model which included
some of the explanatory variables used in (17), Tanzi's estimatcs cannot be used for our dependent
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variable. Therefore, we base our dependent variable on Park's estimates of the Adjusted Gross InCODle
(AGJ) Gap.
The AG I Gap is the AG I figure derived by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from tbe Natiollal
Income Accounts minus the AGI figure reported by the Ihternal Revenue Service (IRS). The former i..
proxy for reportable income while the latter is income actually reported to the tax authorities. Therefore,
the Gap is a measure of the nondeclared income received in the official ("above ground") economy, and
does not include "underground" income flows from criminal activity, etc.
However, because the AGI Gap includes income of those not legally required to flIe tax returns, we
adjust tbe Gap by removing from it an imputed value oftbe AGI ofthose not required to flIe tax returtll.
To accomplish this, we follow an approach used by Goode [1976]. This involves using exemption data to
estimate the percentage of the population not covered by tax returns, and assuming that tbe income of
this group equals, on average, that reported on nontaxable returns. Tbe adjusted Gap is then expreaec!
as a percentage of the income measure defined below.
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION , II. Tbis variable is calculated as the moving average of the CUrrent,
one-year, and two-year lagged values of the percentage of total tax returns audited each year by tbe IRS.
The reason for using this moving average is as follows. An individual's subjective evaluation of tile
probability of being detected may, in part, depend on wbether or not be/she knows someone wbo bu
been audited recently. Tbis, in turn, is assumed to be a positive function ofthe percentage oftotal retuma
audited.
PENALTY RATE, 6. For this we use the ratio of the additional taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by
the IRS during tbe year in question, to the amount of taxes evaded. This specification was chosen for two
reasons. First, because the U.S. Tax Code specifies different fines for different types of offenses, no sinate
statutory penalty figur~ can be used. Second, because this measure includes interest cbarges, it captures
tbe effect of interest rates on the cost of evasion. Penalties are expressed as a percentage of evaded !aXel
ratber than evaded income in order to be consistent witb tbe U.S. practice and witb our theoretica1
model. Since tbe actual amount of evaded taxes depends on unreported income, the way this variable is
constructed may introduce an error-in-variable bias. Tberefore, we follow Durbin's [1954] approach for
constructing an instrumental variable. This involves ranking tbe sample in order of tbe variable
measured with error and using this rank order as an instrument.
TAX RATE, 8 . Here we use a weigbted average marginal tax rate constructed using a scbeme suggested
by Wright [1969]. Tbis involves averaging tbe marginal rates in eacb year's tax schedule after weightin,
them by tbe percentage of total AGI in tbe corresponding tax bracket.
TRUE INCOME, y. Given that the dependent variable is based on tbe Adjusted AGI Gap, tbe
appropriate measure of true income is BEA AGI adjustedforthe income of those not required toflletax
returns. Because the inflation rate is included in the model as a separate variable, we specify true income
in real terms. However, using Adjusted BEA AGI as an independent variable may result in simultaneity
bias. Therefore, we instrument this variable by regressing it on all exogenous variables in the model, U
well as the current and past values of the money stock (MI) and government expenditures. This means
that (17) is estimated using the autoregressive analogue of the two-stage least squares procedure.
INFLATION RATE, p. To measure inflation, we use tbe rate of change of the Consumer Price Index.
We also used the Implicit GNP Deflator and obtained results consistent with those reported in (18).
INTEREST RATE, r. Our measure of the rate of interest is an average of the savings and time deposit
rate. Because the inflat ion rate enters equation (17) as a separate explanatory variable, the savings and
time deposit rate was converted into real terms by removing from it the inflation rate as defined above.
This allows us to capture the pure effect of interest rates on evasion. We also estimated (17) using tbe
three-month Treasury Bill yield, which produced results comparable to those shown in (18).
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WAGE AND SALARY SHARE, w. To control for the composition of income, we include the share of
wages and salaries in national income as a separate variable in equation (17).
APPENDIX B
DATA SOURCES
The data used in the construction of A, as well as y, were taleen from T.S. Parle, "The Relationship
Between Personal Income and Adjusted Gross Income, 1947-78", SUrlley o/Current Business, November
1981, pp. 24-28, and p. 46, as well as more recent volumes of the SlIrlIey o/Cllrrent Bllsiness. The data
used for calculating n, and a, were obtained from Internal Revenue Service, Annllal Report:
Commissioner 0/ IRS, U.S. Government Printing Office, tbe 1947-81 issues. Tbe data used for
constructing 9, as well as the exemption data used to adjust the Gap were taleen from Internal Revenue
Service, Statistics 0/ Income - Individual Returns, U.S. Government Printing Office, the 1947-81 issues.
The data for all other variables were obtained from the Economic Report of the President, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1984.

Summary: Time Value of Money and Income Tax Evasion Under Risk-averse Behavior: Theoretical
Analysis and Empirical Evidence. - This paper examines the effect of interest rates on tax evasion. It
begins by developing a simple theoretical model of a risle-averse individual whose evasion decision
depends on the interest rate, tbe probability of detection, tbe penalty rate, tbe tax rate, the level of true
income, and the price level. Comparative static analysis reveals that the direction of the relationship
between interest rates and evasion depends upon altitude towards risle. Under Arrow's Hypotbesis of
increasing relative risle aversion, it is determined that a direct relationsbip can be expected from interest
rates to the proportion of income underreported. As for tbe other explanatory variables, results
consistent with those reported in previous tbeoretical literature are obtained. In order to provide
additional insight, empirical analysis of auregate U.S. data coveringtbe period 1947-81 is conducted.
The results indicate tbat evasion and interest rates are indeed directly related. They also support
previous empirical findings regarding the relationship between evasion and its other major
determinants.

Rkumr. LtJ valeur-temps de la monnaie et Nvasion de fimptlt sur Ie revenu SOlIS un comportement
d' aversion au risque: analyse thlorique et Ividence empirique. - Cet article examine I'effet des taux
d'inter~t sur I'evasion fiscale. II commence en developpant un mod~le theorique simple d'un individu
adverse au risque dontla decision d'evasion depend du taux d'inte~t, de la probabilite de detection, du
taux de pena1ite, du taux d'impl!t, du niveau du vrai revenu et du niveau des prix. L'analyse statique
comparative indique que la direction de la relation entre les tau x d'inter~t et I'evasion depend de
I'attitude envers Ie risque. Sous I'hypothhe d' Arrow d'une aversion relative croissante au risque, I'on
determine que I'on peut s'attendre a une relation directe des taux d'inter~t a la proportion du revenu
sous-evalue. En ce qui concerne les autres variables explicatives,l'on obtient des resultats analogues avec
ceux mentionnk dans la litterature theorique anterieure. Afin de fournir des informations
supplementaires, nous avons mene une analyse empirique des auregats relatifs aux Etats-Unis pour la
periode 1947-1981. Ces rkultats indiquent que I'evasion et les taux d'ioteret sont effectivement
directement relies. lis confirment aussi des resultats empiriques anterieurs a propos des relations entre
I'evasion et des autres determinants majeurs.
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Z __ me.f_a: Zeilliclter Wert des Geldes "lid EillkommellsteueTliermeidullg bei Ri.rikoabllnfUIII:
TiteoretiJclte Allalyse "lid empirisc/te Evidellz. - Oer Artikel untersucht den Errekt von Zinsen aufSteuervermeidung mittels cines einfachen theoretiscben Modclls mit einem risikobewuBten Individuum, deasen Entscheidung zugtinsten der Steuervermeidunll von der HlIbe der Zinsen, der Wahrscheinlicbkeil
der Aufdeckung, dem StrafmaB, dem Steuersatz, der HlIbe des tatsllchlichen Einkommens und dctn
Preisniveau abhllnlll. Eine komparativ-statische Analyse zeilll, daB das Verhllltnis zwischen Zinsen unci
Steuerhinterziehunll von der Einstellunll zum Risiko abbllnlll. Arrows Hypotbese der zunehmendcn relativen Risikoabneiaunll deutet auf eine direkte Verbindunll zwiscben Zinsen und nicbt-erklllrtem Em.
kommen hin. Hinsichtlich der anderen erkllirenden Variablen stimmen die Ergebnisse mit denen fr11ll.
rer theoretischer Arbeiten Uberein. Oarilber binaus wird eine empirische Analyse auregimer US-Oalen
fUr den Zeitraum 1947-81 durcblleCUbrt, die zu dcm Eraebnis kommt, daB Steuervermeidunll und Zilllell
tatsllcblicb in direktem Zusammenbanll steben. Sie unterstreicbt frUbere empiriscbe Untersucbungen ina
Hinblick auf das Verbllltnis zwiscben Steuervermeidunll und anderen wesentlicben Oeterminanten.

